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ABC V. AEREO AND THE HUMBLE 
JUDGE 
James Y. Stern∗ 
American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.1 was a lawyer’s 
case if ever there was one.  Aereo, a New York-based tech startup, 
offered a service that allowed subscribers to watch local broadcast 
television through an internet connection, thus bypassing the need 
for cable service to receive ordinary network programming.  The 
trouble is that copyright law forbids retransmitting television pro-
grams to the public without the copyright-holder’s consent, which 
doesn’t come cheap.2  Aereo, however, thought it could avoid any 
copyright problems through an unusual set-up.  It devised a system 
in which it maintained thousands of tiny television antennas, each 
about the size of a dime.  A subscriber watching a program through 
Aereo’s service would be assigned a unique antenna.  The signal 
from the antenna would then be converted into a digital file on 
                                                            
 
 
 
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law.   
1 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
2 For cable companies, the cost of copyright is diminished by the statutory licens-
ing regime established by the Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 111.  The cost of re-
broadcasting network programming is nevertheless substantial by virtue of the “re-
transmission consent” provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, which separately require permission from broadcasters to 
retransmit their broadcasts. See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b). 
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Aereo’s computers, again assigned only to the subscriber, which the 
subscriber could then watch through a streaming interface virtually 
simultaneous with the broadcast over the airwaves.  The system 
was intended to capitalize on previously recognized limits on the 
scope of copyright law. 
Despite this peculiar arrangement, Aereo was immediately 
sued by various broadcast television interests holding copyrights in 
material Aereo subscribers received.   Broadcast television is given 
to viewers for free, of course, and broadcasters have traditionally 
derived the bulk of their revenues from advertising.  One might 
think broadcasters would be enthusiastic about the prospect of dis-
tributing their material more widely and easily.  But the broadcast 
networks have become increasingly dependent on royalties paid by 
cable companies, which themselves enjoy considerable market 
power.  By repelling Aereo, broadcasters preserved the ability to 
base their business model on recouping a portion of the subscrip-
tion fees cable providers receive from their customers, rather than 
on advertising alone. 
The essential legal issue in Aereo concerned the scope of control 
over broadcasts of copyrighted material conferred by copyright 
law.  Confusingly, however, the statutory question turned on the 
meaning of a copyright-holder’s exclusive right “to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly.”3  The Copyright Act does not refer to 
an exclusive right to broadcast a copyrighted work; rather, it classi-
fies transmitting to the public as a type of public performance, like 
reciting, dancing, and acting.4 
                                                            
 
 
 
3 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).   
4 The definitional section of the Copyright Act, Section 101, provides that:  
   To “perform” a work means … in the case of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the 
sounds accompanying it audible. 
   To perform … a work “publicly” means… to transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance … of the work … to the public, by means of 
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of re-
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Much attention in the case centered on whether Aereo was per-
forming “publicly,” given the use of individual antennae and indi-
vidual files.  All sides evidently assumed that a transmission to only 
one person is not “to the public.”  The question was how to count 
transmissions.  Should each sending of a broadcast signal be treated 
as a separate transmission—in which case no transmission ever 
reached more than a single subscriber?  Or should the separate 
sending of signals to different subscribers but relaying the same 
underlying content be treated as a single, aggregate transmission—
in which case transmissions through the Aereo service were un-
doubtedly public? 
In constructing its system, Aereo relied on the Second Circuit’s 
earlier Cartoon Networks decision.5  Cartoon Networks dealt with re-
mote DVR technology supplied by a cable company, which essen-
tially replicates the ability to record television programs at home 
but by means of equipment owned and maintained by the cable 
company, rather than the viewer.  The Cartoon Networks court con-
cluded that transmissions of each user’s file containing a given rec-
orded program to the user were private transmissions for copyright 
purposes.  Aereo’s peculiar model with the thousands of micro-
antennae followed the path laid out in Cartoon Networks, and, Aereo 
argued, was clearly permissible under that decision.  The District 
Court in the Aereo litigation agreed, denying a request for a prelim-
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
ceiving the performance … receive it in the same place or in separate plac-
es and at the same time or at different times. 
   To “transmit” a performance … is to communicate it by any device or 
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from 
which they are sent. 
17 U.S.C. § 101. 
5 See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
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inary injunction to shut the service down.6  The Second Circuit af-
firmed and rejected calls to reconsider Cartoon Networks.7 
But the story was different at the Supreme Court.  Joined by 
five of his colleagues, Justice Breyer saw Aereo’s system as a clear 
attempt to evade copyright law by means of the most technical of 
technicalities, and declared that Aereo was very much engaged in 
transmitting to the public.  The conclusion was partly grounded in 
the text, but more generally in a congressional purpose to ensure 
that copyright law covered rebroadcasts by cable companies.  Short-
ly before enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, the Supreme Court 
decided a pair of cases involving early forms of cable, holding that 
the cable providers did not violate copyright holders’ exclusive per-
formance rights.8  According to Justice Breyer, Congress added the 
transmission language in the 1976 Act to overturn the results of 
those decisions.  Aereo’s use of individual antennae and distinct 
computer files for each subscriber was therefore irrelevant, for one 
simple reason: “In terms of the Act’s purposes, these differences do 
not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems.”9 
In dissent, Justice Scalia sidestepped the public-versus-private 
question, arguing instead that Aereo did not “perform” at all for 
purposes of the Copyright Act—not because there wasn’t a perfor-
mance but because Aereo wasn’t the performer.10  On his reading, it 
was the Aereo subscriber alone who actually transmits the copy-
righted work, not Aereo.  Aereo merely supplied the equipment 
necessary to transmit a broadcast to the subscriber’s computer.  Just 
                                                            
 
 
 
6 See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. AEREO, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
7 See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).  See also WNET, 
Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying rehearing en banc). 
8 See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists TV, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
9 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2498. 
10 The district court had declined to reach the issue given its conclusion that the 
case was controlled by Cartoon Networks. 
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as a copyshop does not itself engage in the act of copying when a 
customer uses one of its photocopiers, Aereo did not perform a 
work when a subscribers logged in and obtained content via its sys-
tem.  Copyright, he argued, requires a “volitional act,” and because 
the Aereo subscriber, not Aereo, decided when and what to trans-
mit, the subscriber alone was the performing party for purposes of 
copyright law. 
The Aereo decision appears to defy a number of ready assump-
tions.  Although intellectual property law is not as ideologically 
charged as constitutional law, it has its political valences, with a 
somewhat greater enthusiasm for the defense and expansion of IP 
protection on the right than on the left.11  In Aereo, however, it was 
the three justices conventionally identified as the most politically 
conservative—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—who were unwilling to 
find infringement.  By contrast, the majority’s opinion was authored 
by Stephen Breyer, author of an early academic critique of copy-
right law.12  One need not believe justices simply vote their prefer-
ences to think that in complex and textually ambiguous cases like 
Aereo, those preferences will exert some pull on the way interpretive 
questions are approached.  Aereo, however, seems to come out 
backwards as a matter of predilection. 
Then there is methodology.  Copyright is governed by a bulky 
and elaborate statute, and Aereo was expected to turn on a fine pars-
ing of the statutory language, the definition of “publicly” in particu-
lar.  Yet while Justice Scalia is surely the foremost judicial advocate 
of textualism, his challenge to Justice Breyer lay not in an analysis of 
either the verb “perform” or the adverb “publicly” but the seeming-
                                                            
 
 
 
11 See Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi, Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intel-
lectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 803 (2009) (concluding politi-
cal ideology “is a significant determinant of IP cases.”).  See also DEBORA J. HALBERT, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE POLITICS OF EXPANDING 
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS (1999). 
12 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). 
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ly existential, theoretical question of who the performer is when a 
performance occurs. This is not a “textual” question in the ordinary 
sense; a dictionary definition of “perform” will not reveal whether 
A’s provision of the means by which B accomplishes some task 
should be treated as a situation in which A performs the same act as 
B.  Neither, however, is it at odds with a textual approach to copy-
right.  Legal construction and legal systems inevitably depend on a 
vocabulary of assumed concepts.  To acknowledge that the action 
may be taking place off the textual stage is not to depart from a 
commitment to a text-centric mode of interpretation, although the 
frequency with which such problems occur may weaken the case 
for such a method. 
Meanwhile, although Justice Breyer’s opinion ultimately cen-
tered on congressional purpose, rather than textual niceties, he 
dwelt on the text at considerable length.  Moreover, his seemingly 
more pragmatic analysis itself rested upon some formal, if unarticu-
lated, premises.  Aereo argued that it was supplying technology 
that would have been perfectly lawful for viewers to use them-
selves, by watching with rabbit ears on their own television sets.  If 
Aereo’s business had been to rent television antennas, delivering 
them by physical possession, it is hard to imagine Breyer would 
have decided that Aereo was “substantially similar” to a cable pro-
vider.13  Breyer’s conclusion seems to give decisive weight to the 
location of the antenna—whether it is on Aereo’s property or the 
Aereo subscriber’s.  Put differently, if Aereo had sent antennas to its 
subscribers, rather signals from antennas, it would not have been 
“performing publicly.”  The point is not that this distinction is nec-
essarily unjustifiable but that no justifications were provided.  Brey-
er’s analysis, no less than Scalia’s, relies on an assumed conceptual 
framework to cabin the field of inquiry. 
                                                            
 
 
 
13 See Aereo, 134 S. Ct., at 2506 (“In providing this service, Aereo uses its own 
equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users' homes.”). 
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Recognizing the role played by assumed concepts is important 
because those concepts themselves embed practical judgments and 
offer strategies for dealing with problems that may otherwise ex-
haust interpretive resources.  Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the need 
for a “voluntary act” is a good example.  The great shadow hanging 
over the Aereo case is the vast technological infrastructure that the 
Court by its own admission does not really understand.  In particu-
lar, the fear raised in advance of Aereo was that a decision against 
the company would jeopardize practices like cloud computing and 
remote data storage, in which firms enable users to perform tasks 
through an internet connection on the companies’ own hardware in 
ways that replicate functions that might otherwise be performed 
using the user’s own equipment. 
Technological developments are blurring the lines used to sepa-
rate actions and objects into the categories used to structure legal 
systems.  Tasks that were once performed entirely in-house now 
involve a more intensive contribution by outsiders.  Obtaining, re-
ceiving, transmitting, organizing, analyzing, and storing data are 
less likely to be carried out on a discrete “PC” in ways entirely with-
in the control of the user.  And tasks that were performed by out-
siders now involve more substantial end-user participation.  Under 
the old model, television broadcast networks and cable television 
providers choose what will be available to watch and when.  Today, 
services like Netflix supply content but enable users to make those 
choices.  Remote connections make it possible for users to share 
common resources—hardware, software, and data—and enable 
greater flexibility in being able to use those capabilities than when 
users have to supply equivalent goods to themselves.  All of this is 
to the good, but it strains legal rules that were not designed with 
such complex interrelationships in mind.14 
                                                            
 
 
 
14  See Jonah M. Knobler, Performance Anxiety: The Internet and Copyright’s Vanish-
ing Performance/distribution Distinction, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 531, 533 (2007) 
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Justice Scalia’s stress on legal principles of agency and respon-
sibility—in this case, through the “volitional act doctrine”—is a sen-
sible response to such issues.  The question he put his finger on is 
essentially a variant on the problem of proximate cause to which 
law students are introduced almost as soon as their legal education 
begins; the context may be novel, but the problem is one the law has 
worked over many times.  The doctrine Scalia would have used to 
decide the case offers one analytical tool to draw lines more precise-
ly, now that processes are becoming more integrated.  Whether 
Scalia provided the best or most persuasive answer to the responsi-
bility question, he asked the right question. 
At the same time, however, it may well be that the “volitional 
act” concept is not up to the task in the long run.  The distinction 
between an on-demand video service, which selects its library of 
programs, and a service like Aereo, which seemingly takes its pro-
gramming as it comes, is hardly airtight.  If Netflix buys its titles in 
bulk from a particular studio, does it really “curate” its collection?  
While there is a definite risk of overreacting to technological devel-
opments and underestimating the adaptability of existing legal con-
structs, it is nevertheless true that “digital technology produces a 
breakdown and conflation of legal categories that were meaningful 
in the analog era.”15  But again, the need for new conceptual 
frameworks is less likely to be recognized unless the role played by 
existing frameworks is appreciated. 
In the final analysis, Aereo may be less useful as a window into 
the path copyright law is likely to follow in the realm of media and 
communications technology than as an illustration of two alterna-
tive attitudes to the problem of technological change.  “A man’s got 
to know his limitations,” said a famous San Franciscan.  It wasn’t 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
(questioning whether the “traditional categories and distinctions in copyright law—
such as the once obvious distinction among ‘performances,’ ‘reproductions,’ and 
‘distributions’—remain meaningful and applicable in the Internet context at all.”). 
15 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §8.024 (2008). 
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Stephen Breyer, but it might as well have been.  Breyer is altogether 
aware of his shortcomings as an analyst of things high-tech—as in-
deed is the Court more generally.16  Breyer’s Aereo opinion was de-
signed to be minimal.  Its “limited holding,” he wrote, should not 
have the effect either “to discourage or to control the emergence or 
use of different kinds of technologies” in ways Congress did not 
intend.17  The lynchpin of the Court’s decision was its conclusion 
that Aereo’s service was “highly similar” to the kinds of cable re-
transmission Congress intended to reach in the Copyright Act.18 
This was meant as reassurance.  Developers of new technology 
need not fret, so long as they can avoid offering something that 
looks like, or almost like, cable television.  The message, in other 
words, was “We know ’em when we see ’em—and so do you.  So 
don’t worry.  We’ll get this right.” 
The problem with this approach is two-fold.  First, it rests on an 
exaggerated self-confidence.  It assumes judicial judgments as to 
what are and are not cable equivalents will be so obviously correct 
that reasonable minds will have no real difficulty figuring out what 
activities fall within the danger zone.  Having reached a conclusion, 
it is natural to think its logic is self-evident.  But there will always 
be close cases, and a standard based on similarity to cable television 
                                                            
 
 
 
16 See, e.g., City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary 
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerg-
ing technology before its role in society has become clear.”).  One may say of the 
Court’s modesty that it has much to be modest about.  At oral argument in a recent 
Fourth Amendment case, for example, Justice Breyer admitted he did not know what 
kind of phone he has “because I can never get into it because of the password.”  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, United States v. Wurie, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-
212), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ argu-
ment_transcripts/13-212_g2il.pdf. “The justices are not necessarily the most techno-
logically sophisticated people,” according to Justice Elena Kagan, who explains that 
“the court hasn’t really ‘gotten to’ email.” Kagan: Justices Not Tech Savvy, Send 
Paper Memos, Associated Press, August 20, 2013. 
17 Aereo, 134 S. Ct., at 2510. 
18 Id. at 2511. 
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seems likely to produce more than its fair share of them.  After all, 
even Aereo is not functionally identical to cable, not only because it 
also offers recording capabilities but also because it delivers data 
directly to computers, tablets, and similar devices.19 
The second problem is that the cable similarity test bears no re-
lation to the language of the statute or the Aereo Court’s various 
statements interpreting that language.  Consider the example of 
remote DVR services.  Time-shifting—the practice of recording a 
program for later playback— certainly seems quite different from 
the early forms of cable transmission to which Congress was re-
sponding when it enacted the relevant provisions of the Copyright 
Act in 1976.  The statute itself, however, speaks only of performing 
“publicly.”  The Aereo majority’s central argument in response to 
the Second Circuit was that multiple separate acts of communica-
tion to separate recipients counts as a transmission “to the public” 
so long as the same content is relayed to each, and that concept is 
not limited to cable television equivalents.  It plainly implicates ser-
vices like remote DVR services, not to mention remote data storage 
more generally, cloud computing, internet service provision, and so 
on.  Perhaps the Court did not intend its discussion to be taken se-
riously, but investors, entrepreneurs, and litigants ignore the 
Court’s stated reasoning at their peril. 
The irony of Aereo, then is that the Court’s minimalist instinct is 
grounded in a fear of disrupting high-tech fields and squelching 
innovation, but the Court’s very reticence and unwillingness to seek 
consistency may encourage those results.  The Court should not be 
faulted for self-conscious prudence, restraint, and humility.  But the 
question is what to do when one knows that one knows so little.  It 
                                                            
 
 
 
19 There are other differences, such as the non-broadcast content cable companies 
supply.  In addition, Aereo has no particular advantage in the market over competi-
tors, while cable companies have long enjoyed market power.  See Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., Aereo and Copyright’s Private-Public Performance Line, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
205, 215–217 (2014). 
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may generally be better in the fast-changing world of technological 
innovation to have clear rules and adhere to the standard tools of 
legal reasoning than to pull back and retreat into vagueness when 
the consequences seem uncertain.  The nervous driver may be in-
clined to slow down in trying to pull onto a crowded and fast-
moving highway, but the safer course is often to speed up.  Aereo 
might seem like a quirky case with funny facts, but the problem of 
relating transmissions of data to copyright law is one that will only 
grow in importance in the years ahead.  At some point, real guid-
ance will have to be provided, whether the Court likes it or not. 
 
